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Critical Perspectives on Environmental Protection in Non-International Armed Conflict: 
Developing the Principles of Distinction, Proportionality and Necessity 
Abstract 
This article presents a timely and relevant critical examination of the customary international law 
principles of distinction, proportionality, and the doctrine of military necessity and the extent to 
which they can be better interpreted to protect the environment during the conduct of hostilities 
in non-international armed conflict. In so doing, this article contributes new perspectives to the 
ongoing debate on how environmental protection ought to be enhanced during non-international 
armed conflict. The article also suggests ways in which the International Law Commission might 
approach the development of draft principles based on these customary principles as part of their 
current programme of work.  
Keywords 
Non-International Armed Conflict; Environment; International Law Commission; Customary 
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1. Introduction 
The need to improve environmental protection in non-international armed conflict has arguably 
never been greater. Despite the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts in the present day1 
causing damage to the environment and high-value natural resources2 such as oil, gas, timber and 
                                                          
1 See for example Christopher Mullins, ‘Conflict Victimisation and Post-Conflict Justice 1945-2008’ in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.) The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-
Conflict Justice’ (Intersentia, 2010), pp. 67-107. See also the remarks of Mr. Park at the 3266th Meeting of the 
International Law Commission: International Law Commission, ‘Provisional summary record of the 3266th meetin 
[sic]’, Sixty-seventh session (second part), A/CN.4/SR.3266, 20 May 2016 at p. 7 and p. 10 
2 See the views of Mr. El-Murtadi at the 3269th Meeting of the International Law Commission: International Law 
Commission, ‘Provisional summary record of the 3269th meeting’, Sixty-seventh session (second part), 
A/CN.4/SR.3269, 22 September 2015 at p. 9 
mineral mines, and in areas of environmental significance such as national parks and special areas 
of conservation, the laws of armed conflict remain dangerously out of touch with the realities of 
modern conflict. While specific provisions in Additional Protocol I purport to regulate the degree 
of environmental damage that can be caused in international armed conflict3, no such restrictions 
apply during non-international armed conflict.4 Despite frequent calls for the improvement of the 
environmental laws of non-international armed conflict,5 meaningful progress in this regard has 
not been made to date.6 However an unprecedented and long overdue opportunity for such reform 
now exists through the examination of environmental protection in times of armed conflict by the 
                                                          
3 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 Arts. 35(3) and 55(1). The thresholds of harm 
in these provisions have been heavily criticised. 
4 It has been suggested that the provisions of Additional Protocol I related to environmental damage arguably apply 
as a matter of customary international law in non-international armed conflict. See the ICRC’s Customary  Law 
Database, Rule 45 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule45> (accessed 11 March 
2019). However analysis of the state practice and opinio juris presented as evidence demonstrates that there is no clear 
intention on the part of states to extend the applicability of these provisions beyond the conflicts to which Additional 
Protocol I applies. For example, when drafting the Statute of the International Criminal Court, states had the 
opportunity to reflect such emerging customary practice in new provisions relating to war crimes. However, they 
decided not to create a war crime in non-international armed conflict of causing widespread, long-term or severe 
environmental damage. They did however affirm the applicability of this provision during in international armed 
conflict through Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Statute. 
5 United Nations Environment Programme, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of 
International Law (UNEP Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch 2009), p. 4. See also remarks made by the 
former -UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, who previously requested that states ‘clarify and expand international 
law on environmental protection in times of war’. He further insisted that ‘[e]xisting legal instruments should be 
adapted to reflect the predominantly internal nature of today's armed conflicts.’ Message of the UN Secretary-General, 
Ban Ki-moon on the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed 
Conflict 6 November 2009 < http://www.un.org/zh/events/environmentconflictday/pdfs/int_law.pdf >, p. 82, 
(accessed 11 March 2019) 
6 Analysis of Articles 35(5) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, supra n. 3, Articles 35(3) and 55 which prohibit parties to 
international armed conflicts from causing widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage, has dominated 
the scholarship to date. Since no provisions comparable to those in Additional Protocol I were included in Additional 
Protocol II - Sylvie Junod, ‘Additional Protocol II: Scope and History’ (1983-1984) 33 American University Law 
Review 29, 33-34 - no treaty-based laws of non-international armed conflict exist to directly prohibit environmental 
damage, and this may explain the analytical deficit. See also Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David 
Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 
International Review of the Red Cross 569, at p. 579 noting the deficiencies in IHL as it relates to environmental 
protection in non-international armed conflict despite these conflicts being the most prevalent classification amongst 
contemporary armed conflicts. 
International Law Commission.7 Indeed, there may be ‘no other international body with the 
knowledge, authority and terms of reference to accomplish …[the]… task’8 of finally achieving 
enhanced protection for the environment during armed conflict, and in particular, during non-
international armed conflict. This article makes very timely and relevant observations about the 
difference in the way that the customary international law principles of distinction, proportionality 
and military necessity apply differently during non-international armed conflict. Should the 
International Law Commission wish to take advantage of these differences in discussing and 
developing principles de lege ferenda9on the protection of the environment in non-international 
armed conflict, conflict circumstances that have long evaded clear and enforceable restrictions on 
the degree of environmental harm may finally be considered.10 
Exploring the differences between the applicability of these three key provisions of customary 
international humanitarian law as between international and non-international armed conflict is 
important as some scholars have suggested that customary principles can only be interpreted 
according to the parameters set by treaty-based provisions, even if doing so lowers the degree of 
                                                          
7 The Statute of the International Law Commission states in Article 1(1) that it ‘shall have for its object the promotion 
of the progressive development of international law and its codification’. Progressive development is defined in Article 
15 of the Statute as ‘the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by 
international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.’ 
Moreover the aims of the ILCs programme of work were described by the Special Rapporteur, in proposing the topic 
to the ILC, as amongst other things, to ‘Clarify the relation between existing treaty law and new legal developments 
(including legal reasoning); Suggest what needs to be done to achieve a uniform and coherent system (so as to prevent 
the risk of fragmentation); Envisage the formulation of applicable rules and formulate principles of general 
international law of relevance for the topic’. Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third Session, 
A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), p. 358 
8 Erik Koppe, ‘The Principle of Ambituity and the Prohibition against Excessive Collateral Damage to the 
Environment during Armed Conflict’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 53, p. 64 
9 Some members of the Commission, in discussions, appeared open to not only reflecting existing law in draft 
principles, but also to proposing new articles with a view to developing future law. See for example the views of Mr. 
Hmoud during the 3268th Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra n. 9, at p. 11 
10 Indeed some Commissioners have asserted the point of view that to fail to address applicable law in non-
international armed conflicts would result in the ILC’s work having a minimal effect. See for example the views of 
Mr. Hmoud during the 3268th Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra n. 9, at p. 11 
environmental protection that could otherwise result.11 As non-international armed conflicts are 
not shackled to the problematic environmental provisions in Additional Protocol I - there are no 
comparative provisions in Additional Protocol II - the customary principles of distinction, 
proportionality and military necessity can, and should, be authoritatively interpreted in a way that 
provides the greatest degree of environmental protection possible in non-international armed 
conflict. The analysis in this article serves to advance the debate on the legal differences between 
environmental protection international and non-international armed conflict12 by asserting that the 
absence of a specific environmental provision in Additional Protocol II could actually be an 
advantage when exploring ways in which existing provisions could be more purposively 
                                                          
11 See Cordula Droege and Marie-Louise Tougas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict – 
Existing Rules and Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 21, discussing 
at p. 26 the position that protecting the environment as a civilian object would frustrate the provisions of Additional 
Protocol I. This argument is based on the premise that as the environment is specifically mentioned in Additional 
Protocol I, drafters clearly intended a different threshold of damage to apply to environmental objects regardless of 
their status as civilian or otherwise. However no provisions equating to those in Additional Protocol I are found in 
Additional Protocol II and so such an argument does not apply during non-international armed conflict. Koppe, supra 
n. 8, makes a similar argument at pp. 72-73 by suggesting that as environmental provisions were enumerated in 
Additional Protocol I, customary law cannot be interpreted to change the threshold of harm, even if doing so could 
provide greater environmental protection. As there are no similar provisions in Additional Protocol II, even if one 
accepts these arguments, customary law can be interpreted without such restraints in non-international armed conflict 
to provide arguably greater environmental protection that the treaty-based provisions that apply during international 
armed conflict. 
12 Of the small body of scholarship has explored the issue of environmental protection during non-international armed 
conflict to date, international criminal law has been the dominant field of examination, though some consideration 
has been given to indirect protection through other treaty-based laws of non-international armed conflict. See Carl E. 
Bruch, ‘All's Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’ (2000-
2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695; Aurelie Lopez, ‘Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage Occurring in Times 
of Non-International Armed Conflict: Rights and Remedies’ (2006-2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law Review 
231; Aaron Schwabach, ‘Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental 
Damage in Non-International Conflicts’ (2004) 15 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 
1; Theodor Meron, ‘Chapter XX - Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ in Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King and Ronald S. McClain (eds), Protection of the Environment During Armed 
Conflict and Other Military Operations (Naval War College 1996). Throughout the schoalrship, considerations of 
customary international law and its potential to indirectly protect the environment during armed conflict have largely 
taken place either in the explicit context of international armed conflict or without specifying the differences in the 
way customary internayional law applies to protect the environment as between international and non-internaitonal 
armed conflict. This article explores the nuances in protection that are particular to non-international armed conflict, 
with a view to encouraging the International Law Commission, or any organisation in the future attempting to enhance 
and develop the law on this matter, to more fully take into account the specificities of non-international armed conflict 
and the applicable law in those circumstances when formulating principles either based on the lex lata, or in developing 
lex ferenda. 
interpreted. As states have been reluctant to develop new treaty-based law on this issue, 
purposively interpreting existing law might be the only feasible way to enhance and improve 
environmental protection in non-international armed conflict.13 
The International Law Commission have already considered a number of draft principles related 
to environmental protection during armed conflict14, but these draft principles appear at present 
to be extremely conservative statements of existing law which neither explore ways in which 
customary international law differs as between international and non-international armed conflict15 
nor the ways in which fresh interpretations of existing rules could significantly enhance 
environmental protection during non-international armed conflict in particular.16 For example, the 
draft principle that refers collectively to the customary principles discussed in this article simply 
                                                          
13 Although there is considerable merit to arguments which vie for the development of new legal provisions in the 
laws of non-international armed conflict that specifically address environmental damage, without prejudice to those 
views this article takes the position that more purposeful interpretations of the customary international law principles 
of distinction, proportionality and military necessity could result in greater limits being placed on the degree of 
environmental harm that may be caused during the conduct of hostilities in these circumstances without the need to 
overcome all diplomatic obstacles that may be foreseeable in the pursuit of amendments to treaties or the development 
of new treaties. See Peter Richards and Michael Schmitt, ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment 
During Armed Conflict’ (1999) 28 Stetson Law Review 1047, at pp. 1091-1092 where the authors discuss the 
hesitations of the international community to develop new treaties in relation to the protection of the environment in 
armed conflict. Recall the attempts to develop a fifth Geneva convention. On that basis, there is a compelling case to 
be made for deeper consideration to be given to the customary international law principles of distinction, 
proportionality and military necessity by the International Law Commission when progressively developing 
consolidated principles to enhance the protection of the environment in non-international armed conflict under their 
present programme of work, and this article proceeds on that basis.  
14 See proposals made by the Special Rapporteur in the ‘Second report on the protection of the environment in relation 
to armed conflicts’, A/CN.4/685, 28 May 2015 and amended draft principles suggested by the Drafting Committee 
‘Text of the draft introductory provisions and draft principles provisionally adopted so far by the Drafting Committee’, 
A/CN.4/L.870, 22 July 2015 
15 Something that has been noted by members of the Commission. See the views of Mr. Forteau during the 3265th 
Meeting of the International Law Commission. International Law Commission, Provisional Summary Record of the 
3265th Meeting, A/CN.4/SR.3265, 7 August 2015, at p. 10. See also the views of Mr. Hassouna during the 3266th 
Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra n. 1, at p. 5. 
16 Some members of the Commission have called for more detailed analysis of the laws of armed conflict in the context 
of this work. See Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-seventh Session, A/70/10 (2015), 107 § 142. 
Recognising the differences between these two classifications of conflict was important to some members of the 
Commission, and they have expressed a desire for such work to be carried out. See the aforementioned Report of the 
International Law Commission at p. 109 § 147. Indeed exploring environmental protection in non-international armed 
conflict received broad support in discussions at the Commission: International Law Commission, Third Report on 
the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Sixty-Eighth Session A/CN.4/700 (2016), 7 § 25. 
asserts that ‘[t]he law of armed conflict, including the principles and rules on distinction, 
proportionality, military necessity and precautions in attack, shall be applied to the natural 
environment, with a view to its protection.’17 Dynamically interpreting customary international law 
in a way that reflects ‘emerging values cherished by society’18 would ensure that the guidelines or 
principles developed by the International Law Commission do more than merely repeat prior 
attempts at conveying the law as it stands,19 attempts which have been criticised as failing to make 
meaningful progress towards better environmental protection during armed conflict.20 The analysis 
in this article therefore intentionally goes beyond a mere examination of the ways in which the 
customary principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity contribute to 
environmental protection in non-international armed conflict; it challenges all parties engaged in 
the International Law Commission’s programme of work to progressively interpret these key 
customary principles and to include such interpretation in any draft principles that are developed.21 
In purposively interpreting these customary laws, the trajectory of these laws may be altered ever 
so slightly, and in time states may take heed of the direction provided so that a new course is 
chartered, one that responds to the exigencies of contemporary armed conflicts, and ultimately 
converging with global standards of environmental protection.  
 
                                                          
17 International Law Commission, First report on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts by 
Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/720, 20 April 2018, at p. 66 
18 Wil de Verwey, ‘Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: In Search of a New Legal Perspective’ 
(1995) 8 Leiden Journal of International Law 7, at p. 22 
19 For example see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Guidelines for Military Manuals and 
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (Geneva, 1994) 
20 Bothe, Bruch, Diamond, and Jensen, supra n. 6, 573  
21 Regarding the progressive interpretation of existing rules that apply in non-international armed conflict See for 
example the views of Mr. Hmoud during the 3268th Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra n. 9, at p. 
11. See also the views of Mr. Vazquez-Bermudez during the 3269th Meeting of the International Law Commission, 
supra n. 2, at p. 6 
2. The Principle of Distinction  
The principle of distinction, which states that only military objectives can be legitimately targeted 
during the conduct of hostilities22, is considered ‘the first test to be applied in warfare’23. Under 
this principle, civilians and civilian objects can never be the legitimate object of an attack. If the 
environment is considered to be a civilian object – and scholars have argued strongly for this 
interpretation24 - then it benefits from absolute protection against attack under the principle of 
distinction, making it unlawful to target the environment directly under any circumstances. 
However, protection as a civilian object may be lost if the environment, or any part of it, is defined 
as a military objective.25 As a military objective, the environment, or any part of it, would be a 
legitimate target.26 Indeed he extent to which the environment could be classified as a civilian 
object was the subject of substantial discussion at the International Law Commission.27 It is critical 
that any future consolidated principles developed go beyond merely restating the principle of 
distinction, but instead address some of the inherent problematic issues associated with the 
                                                          
22 Jann K. Kleffner, ‘From 'Belligerents' to 'Fighters' and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities - On the 
Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years After the Second Hague Peace 
Conference’ (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 315, 318 
23 United Nations Environment Programme, supra n. 5, 13.  
24 Amongst others, Karen Hulme, ‘Taking Care to Protect the Environment Against Damage: A Meaningless 
Obligation’, (2010) 92(879) International Review of the Red Cross 675. Hulme has asserted at p. 678 that ‘the 
recognition of the environment as a prima facie civilian object has done more to protect it than any environmentally 
specific rule of international humanitarian law.’ See also Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, at p. 24 highlighting the 
interpretation of the environment as a civilian object, either explicitly or implicitly. 
25 The ICRC observe that the definition of a military objective applies as a matter of custom in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts - ICRC, Customary IHL Database <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule8> accessed 8 March 2018, Rule 8.  
26 Horace B. Robertson Jr., ‘The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict’ [1997] Journal of 
Legal Studies 35, 47 
27  See the Comments of Special Rapporteur summing up the debate during the 3269th Meeting of the International 
Law Commission, supra n. 2, p. 10 
classification of the environment as either civilian or military in nature in non-international armed 
conflict.  
2.1 Classification of the Environment under the Principle of Distinction 
As the principle of distinction permits the targeting of military objectives and prohibits the 
targeting of civilian objects, the environment benefits from protection under this rule when it is 
considered to be a civilian object. It loses protection under the principle of distinction when it is 
considered to be a military objective. The former-Special Rapporteur to the International Law 
Commission proposed a draft principle reflecting this application of the law,28 though she refrained 
from defining the environment as a civilian object, instead opting to classify it as being ‘civilian in 
nature’.29 The critical examination below assesses the extent to which the environment is protected 
by the customary principle of distinction as a civilian object, military objective and dual-use object. 
It is argued that any confusion created by the classification of the environment as a civilian object 
can be overcome with the development of guidance by the International Law Commission to 
support parties to a non-international armed conflict in assessing the environment correctly under 
this principle.  
2.1.1 Classifying the Environment as a Civilian Object 
                                                          
28 International Law Commission ‘Second report on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’ , 
supra n. 14.  
29 However the proposed draft principle was not adopted by the Drafting Committee of the International Law 
Commission. International Law Commission, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Mathias 
Forteau 30 July 2015 
<http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statements/2015_dc_chairman_statement_peac.pd
f&lang=EF > (accessed 11 March 2019). The phrase ‘civilian in nature’ was removed and the overall draft principle 
altered so that the environment would not be referred to as being civilian at all. See International Law Commission, 
Provision summary record of the 3281st meeting, A/CN.4/SR.3281, 29 February 2016, p. 6 
<http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/summary_records/a_cn4_sr3281.pdf&lang=EF>  
(accessed 11 March 2019) 
The laws of armed conflict do not state that the environment is a civilian object per se, but it is 
commonly understood to be civilian in nature30 and the Special Rapporteur to the International 
Law Commission on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict has affirmed 
this prima facie classification.31 There is some dispute as to whether the environment as a whole can 
be classified as civilian, or whether this classification can be applied only to specific objects within 
the environment.32 It would seem that the practice of states and international organisations to date 
has been to refer to the natural environment as a complete entity rather than distinguishing 
between parts of the environment in this regard.33 Therefore, there is a compelling argument to be 
made for interpreting the environment as a whole as being civilian in nature, protected in its 
entirety from direct attack as such. However, whether the environment is interpreted as being 
wholly civilian or civilian in its entirety through the sum of its parts34, the same conclusion is 
reached35: the prima facie interpretation of the environment as a civilian object.  
Some members of the International Law Commission have previously suggested that the 
environment as a whole could not be considered civilian in its entirety by default.36 Alternative 
                                                          
30 Hulme, supra n. 24, 678; Karen Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2007), 209; M.N. 
Schmitt, C.H.B. Garraway and Y. Dinstein, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (San Remo: 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, March 2006), para. 4.2.4.1. 
31 International Law Commission, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, supra n. 14, 49 § 151 
32 Report of the International Law Commission, supra n. 16, 110 § 154; Report of the International Law Commission 
on the Work of its Sixty-seventh Session, A/CN.4/689 (2015), 14 § 62. See also Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, at 
p. 25-26 
33 Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, at p. 26.  
34 In other words, if all environmental objects are presumed to be civilian in the first instance, then that equates to the 
presumption that the environment as a whole is civilian in nature. 
35 Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, at p. 27 
36 See International Law Commission, Provisional summary record of the 3264th meeting, A/CN.4/SR.3264, 6 May 
2016 p. 9.  See also : International Law Commission, supra n. 1, at p. 9 
proposals for draft principles in this regard have refrained from classifying the environment as a 
civilian object, instead asserting that ‘[n]o part of the natural environment may be made the object 
of an attack, unless and until it becomes a military objective’.37 These proposals succeeded in 
replacing the originally proposed draft principles, which means that there is no explicit 
acknowledgement that the environment is a civilian object in the International Law Commission’s 
draft principles as they stand.38  
However it is important to note that recognising the environment as being civilian in nature is not 
an aberration of the laws of armed conflict – and it would not preclude, as some have suggested, 
the movement of troops from a city to a forested area.39 If parts of the area in which armed forces 
are located conform to the definition of military objectives, then they may be targeted. Explicitly 
recognising the default position of all environmental objects as being civilian in nature is significant 
in terms of shaping perceptions, and it explicitly acknowledges that the targeting of environmental 
objects is a deliberate exception rather than a thoughtless consequence of military action during 
armed conflict. One of the major issues that has plagued the laws of armed conflict and their failure 
to adequately prohibit certain types of environmental damage in non-international armed conflict 
is the absence of an explicit recognition that the environment is entitled to protection. Recognising 
the environment as being civilian in nature is important in this regard, and also for the purposes 
of assessing proportionate collateral damage. If it is not explicitly acknowledged that the 
environment as a whole is entitled to protection against direct attack as a civilian object, then 
calculating what amounts to proportionate or disproportionate damage may be seriously affected.  
                                                          
37 See International Law Commission, Provisional summary record of the 3264th meeting, supra n. 36, p. 9 
38 International Law Commission, Text of the draft principles provisionally adopted in 2015 and technically revised 
and renumbered during the present session by the Drafting Committee, A/CN.4/L.870/Rev.1, 26 July 2016, p. 2 
Draft Principle 8(3) 
39 See International Law Commission, Provisional summary record of the 3264th meeting, supra n. 36, p. 10 
Given this conclusion, it is a much more straightforward statement of the law to acknowledge the 
prima facie civilian status of the environment, as that would clearly establish the requirement for 
parties to a non-international armed conflict to refrain from attacking environmental objects 
without consideration, and it would affirm the requirement to evaluate specific environmental 
objects against the definition of military objectives if they are to be the object of an attack. 
Acknowledging the civilian status of the natural environment would compel parties to a non-
international armed conflict to ensure that all parts of the environment directly targeted clearly 
conform to the definition of military objectives. There have been some positive discussions on 
this point at the International Law Commission, and it would certainly be a useful clarification of 
the law if the Commission decided to revisit their proposed draft principles and provide 
determinative guidance in this regard.40 
Recognising, as the Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission has done41, that the 
environment is neither a non-object, nor a benign venue in which conflict takes place, means that 
the environment in general, as well as parts thereof, would benefit from the greatest possible 
protection under the principle of distinction. The any draft principle that fails to acknowledge the 
civilian status of the environment risks creating the impression that the environment is not 
protected against direct attack, a potentially regressive step which might send a message to parties 
engaged in non-international armed conflict that the environment is ‘a valueless part of the scenery 
                                                          
40 Indeed, some members of the Commission ‘suggested that the principle [of distinction] be modified to reflect that 
no part of the environment be made the objective of an attack, unless and until it becomes a military objective.’ 
International Law Commission, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 
supra n. 16, 8 § 28. Clarification of the circumstances in which the environment becomes a civilian object has also 
been called for by Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11. 
41 International Law Commission, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, supra n. 14, 49 § 151. After recognising that the laws of armed conflict suggest that civilian objects are things 
rather than abstract entities, they state that ‘It is possible to conclude that the natural environment is civilian in nature 
and therefore not in itself a military objective.’ Therefore the Commission appears to conclude that the environment 
need not be broken down into its constituent elements to benefit from protection under this principle, but may be 
protected in its entirety as an integrated physical entity.  
in which a battle takes place’.42 Any future principles that are developed should therefore not 
merely affirm the applicability of the principle of distinction when targeting environmental objects, 
but should clearly state that the environment as a whole is presumed to be a civilian object as this 
would create clear instructions for belligerents during the conduct of hostilities in non-
international armed conflict.  
A further justification for classifying the environment as a whole as being civilian in nature would 
be to remove any confusion regarding the concurrent application of customary and treaty-based 
law during non-international armed conflict.  While elements of the environment are protected 
through Article 14 of Additional Protocol II,43 for example, environmental protection as a whole 
is stronger in non-international armed conflict under the customary principle of distinction. Article 
14 limits protection to those objects which, if targeted and destroyed, would cause starvation 
amongst the civilian population. There is no such qualification or limitation attached to the 
protection afforded to civilian objects under the customary principle of distinction. In the absence 
of a clear statement acknowledging the classification of the envurinment as a civilian objects, 
belligerents in non-international armed conflict may prefer to adhere to the treaty-based provision 
as it shields fewer environmental objects from direct attack. Defining the environment as a whole 
as civilian in nature, and affirming the concurrent and compulsory application of the customary 
principle of distinction would reduce the risk that only specific environmental objects essential to 
the survival of the civilian population would be viewed as protected objects during the conduct of 
hostilities. While a principle on the relationship between the principle of distinction and the 
environment has been proposed to the International Law Commission44, it could go much further 
                                                          
42 Hulme, supra n. 24, 678 
43 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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44 International Law Commission, Text of the Draft Introductory Provisions and Draft Principles Provisionally 
Adopted So Far by the Drafting Committee, supra n. 14, Draft Principle II-1(3) 
towards clarifying the applicable law to enhance environmental protection in non-international 
armed conflict. 
2.1.2 Classifying the Environment as a Military Objective 
Military objectives generally include objects that contribute to ‘the enemy’s war-fighting or war-
sustaining capability’45 and it is not difficult to imagine a multitude of circumstances in which the 
environment could be viewed as such during non-international armed conflict: from fuelling and 
funding the conflict, to providing camouflage and sustenance, it is very difficult to completely 
divorce armed conflict from its surrounding environment. Under the principle of distinction, the 
environment can lose its protection as a civilian object only if by reason of its ‘nature, location, 
purpose’46 it makes an ‘effective contribution to military action’,47 and if its ‘partial or total 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage’.48 To the extent that the natural environmental satisfies this criteria, it is no 
longer considered to be a civilian object, but instead a military objective which can be lawfully 
targeted during the conduct of hostilities. The ICRC recognises that the definition of military 
objectives is ‘a wide one, which includes areas of land, objects screening other military objectives 
and war-supporting economic facilities.’49 While elements of the environment do not automatically 
or intrinsically conform to the definition of military objectives, their use by parties to an armed 
                                                          
45 The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Edition July 2007, 
<http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NWP_1-14M_Commanders_Handbook.pdf>  accessed 8 March 2018, 
section 8.2 
46 Additional Protocol I, supra n. 3, Art 52, a rule which has become part of customary international law applicable in 
both international and non-international armed conflict. See also Michael Bothe, Karl J. Partsch and Waldemar A. 
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1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982), 324 
47 Additional Protocol I, supra n. 3, Art 52 
48 Ibid. 
49 ICRC, Customary IHL Database < https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule8> 
accessed 8 March 2018, Rule 8 
conflict means that they can become legitimate targets.50 Therefore classifying the environment as 
a military objective is not, in many circumstances, a conceptual stretch of the imagination. 
In the context of contemporary non-international armed conflicts which have a particularly strong 
connection to the exploitation of natural resources, determining the extent to which the 
environment, or elements of it, satisfy the definition for military objectives, is a pressing issue 
which needs to be addressed in any principles that are developed to enhance environmental 
protection in these circumstances. Natural resources - valuable, precious and vulnerable as they 
are – may be so closely connected to the conflict that classifying them as military objectives may 
not be a challenging exercise. Although objects need to make a contribution to military action to 
be classified as a military objective, such that attacking them will result in military advantage51, in 
many non-international armed conflicts that involve natural resource exploitation, the lines 
between contributing to military action and contributing merely to the ‘war-sustaining capability’52 
of a party engaged in the armed conflict will be blurred. It has been argued that revenue-generating 
natural resources which are exploited by an armed group to support their engagement in a conflict 
do not make a sufficiently direct and effective contribution to military action53,  however the 
contrary could certainly be argued with equal legal weight. For example, if a non-state armed group 
took control of an oil refinery, and if the profits from the sale of that oil are the only source of 
funding supporting the group’s conflict effort, then targeting that refinery could result in a definite 
military advantage. The fact that there is an arguable point in this regard means that environmental 
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51 Ibid. at p. 29 
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objects may be too easily classified as military objectives54, and the protection against attack that 
they benefit from as civilian objects decreases significantly as a result. 
Examples of the way in which environmental objects can be construed as military objectives 
abound throughout the history of non-international armed conflict. During the American Civil 
War, for instance, the destruction of cotton fields was not considered to be a breach of the 
principle of distinction: cotton was the Confederacy’s primary export at the time, the sale of which 
funded the purchase of Confederate supplies and weapons, and so it was considered to be a 
military objective which could be lawfully targeted on that basis.55 Similar issues arise frequently in 
contemporary non-international armed conflicts: the exploitation of natural resources has been 
recognised by the UN Security Council as a major factor in funding and perpetuating armed 
conflict in the Central African Republic56 and as a result such resources may be classified as military 
objectives that can be directly and legitimately attacked during the conduct of hostilities.57 It is 
argued here that any principles that are developed by the International Law Commission could 
compel parties to an armed conflict to construe the definition of military objectives as narrowly as 
possible when it comes to environmental objects, particularly elements of the environment that 
are at risk of additional harm through exploitation as a result of the conflict.  
There is a danger that classifying the environment as a whole as a civilian object might encourage 
belligerents to use civilian environmental objects as shields against attack, much in the same way 
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56 UN Security Resolution 2121, S/Res/2121 (2013); UN Security Resolution 2127, S/Res/2127 (2013) 
57 United Nations Environment Programme, supra n. 5, 13  
that human shields are used.58 However unlike the law relating to human shields59 the  use of 
civilian environmental objects as a shield against attack would merely result in those objects being 
reclassified as military objectives which could be legitimately targeted in attack.60 In contemporary 
non-international armed conflict, ‘[i]nsurgents often use tropical forests as home bases and hiding 
grounds; counter-insurgency forces often respond by slashing and burning forests and by polluting 
rivers, viewing both as legitimate theatres of operations.’61 These kinds of actions undermine the 
protection that the environment, in particular valuable or vulnerable environmental locations, need 
to benefit from during non-international armed conflict. If military targets are deliberately located 
in areas special areas of protection or conservation, for example, the nature of the surrounding 
environment may change from civilian to military, thereby removing the absolute protection 
against attack that would otherwise apply to civilian objects through the principle of distinction. 
The International Law Commission should retain draft principles already proposed in this regard62 
making the use of valuable or vulnerable environmental civilian objects by belligerents in non-
                                                          
58 Gabriel Swiney, ‘Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern War’ (2005) 39 International 
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and as such, he argued that this would more than likely create incentives for belligerents to use human shields and 
deliberately mix military and civilian objects.  
59 ICRC Customary IHL Database < https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter32_rule97> accessed 18 September 2018, Rule 97 
60 Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, arguing at p. 28 that classifying the environmental area in which armed forces are 
located as a military objective would not accord with existing practice under international humanitarian law. Therefore, 
automatically classifying the environment as a military objective simply on the basis of location would apply the 
definition of military objectives too loosely. Examples cited include identifying cities in which armed forces are located 
as military objectives – the entire city would not be considered a military objective, only the very specific areas in 
which armed forces are location, and even at that, the classification as military objective would most likely apply 
through the use of the area, rather than the location. 
61 De Jong, Donovan and Abe (eds), Extreme Conflict and Tropical Forests ; see also Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War 
Against the World: The Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental Crimes’ in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch 
(eds), The  Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2000), 
631 
62 International Law Commission, Text of the draft principles provisionally adopted in 2015 and technically revised 
and renumbered during the present session by the Drafting Committee, supra n. 38, p. 2 Draft Principle 8(3) 
international armed conflict a breach of the principle of distinction, much in the same way that the 
use of human shields is prohibited. 
2.1.3 Classifying the Environment as a Dual-Use Object 
It is ‘beyond dispute’63 that those engaged in non-international armed conflict are required to make 
the primary distinction between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and military 
objectives on the other, before embarking upon any method or means of warfare likely to result 
in harm.64 The law indicates clearly that objects can only have a single status at any given time, 
either civilian or military, never both concurrently. Yet the natural environment will most often 
serve both military and civilian uses simultaneously, and this makes the determination of the 
civilian or military status of environmental objects one of the most difficult applications of the 
principle of distinction in contemporary non-international armed conflict.  
As a dual-use object, strictly separating the areas or times of civilian use from military use when 
applying the principle of distinction on the battlefield in non-international armed conflict could 
prove extremely problematic.65 The ICRC have concluded, from a review of state practice and 
opinio juris that the law is not clear on what to do where there is doubt as to an object’s civilian or 
military status.66 While there is some, albeit inadequate, guidance in the treaty-based laws of 
international armed conflict, no such provisions exist that apply during non-international armed 
conflict.67  As a dual-use object, therefore, the environment is at risk of significant harm.  
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67 Ibid. 
The International Law Commission are in a strong position to propose principles that clarify the 
law68 and provide guidance to belligerents in order to improve environmental protection in non-
international armed conflict. Such guidance could take many forms: for example, the International 
Law Commission could suggest that special areas of conservation including areas that contribute 
to the solution of global problems such as climate change, food security, or water security, and 
areas of cultural significance, should always be considered civilian objects.69 This would remove 
any element of subjective judgement where such areas were concerned.70 If complimented by a 
principle which makes using irrefutably civilian environmental objects as shields against attack a 
breach of the principle of distinction, greater protection would be achieved for particularly 
important and vulnerable environmental locations than currently exists under the customary laws 
of armed conflict, and that enhanced protection would be directed to parts of the environment 
that perhaps could be argued need protecting the most.  
2.2. Indiscriminate Attacks 
The principle of distinction is sometimes referred to as the principle of discrimination. In this 
regard, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has held that 
‘attacks, even when they are directed against legitimate military targets, are unlawful if conducted 
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comments of Mr. Hmoud during the 3268th Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra n. 9, at p. 13 
69 See Richard G. Tarasofsky, ‘Protecting Specially Important Areas During International Armed Conflict: A Critique 
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70 Richards and Schmitt, supra n. 13, argue at p. 1081 that ‘subjectivity clouds determinations of what is protected, 
and what is not’. 
using indiscriminate means or methods of warfare, or in such a way as to cause indiscriminate 
damage to civilians’71 or civilian objects. In other words, belligerents should not use methods or 
means of warfare that cannot distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, and this 
includes environmental civilian objects. The prohibition against indiscriminate attacks applies as a 
matter of custom in non-international armed conflict72 and the application of this prohibition to 
environmental civilian objects could be emphasised in any future principles that are developed by 
the international community, as at present it does not feature in the draft principles that are under 
consideration at the International Law Commission.73  
2.3 Conclusion to the Principle of Distinction 
The principle of distinction prohibits damage to the environment in non-international armed 
conflict when the environment is classified as a civilian object. It does not prohibit damage when 
the environment is classified as a military objective. Suggestions to strengthen the way in which 
the principle of distinction can better protect the environment have previously been made, and 
they assert, in relation to the ICRC’s Customary Law Study, that the customary rule should state 
that ‘[t]he natural environment may not be attacked, unless it is a military objective and only to the 
extent that it is a military objective’74. While such suggestions echo the present draft principles that 
have been proposed by the International Law Commission, and are without question a helpful 
starting point, the real difficulties in applying the principle of distinction to enhance environmental 
protection relate to determining the civilian or military status of the environment: that is not always 
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72 ICRC, Customary IHL Database < https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule11> 
accessed 8 March 2018, Rule 11 
73 International Law Commission, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, supra n. 14, 49 § 151 
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a straightforward or simple exercise. Given the strong connection between the environment, 
natural resources and contemporary non-international armed conflict, a more detailed examination 
of the way in which the environment changes from civilian to military classification during these 
circumstances is fully warranted. Where the environment is considered to be a dual-use object, it 
is at risk of significant harm, and there should be a presumption in favour of recognising the 
environment, or certain elements of it, as being irrefutably civilian in nature to protect particularly 
vulnerable or important parts of the environment from direct and indiscriminate harm during non-
international armed conflict. Principles developed by the International Law Commission could 
also usefully emphasise the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks to give belligerent parties a 
clear, accurate and complete statement of the law. 
3. The Principle of Proportionality 
The customary principle of proportionality is another foundational concept within the laws of 
armed conflict,75 and it was referred to in draft principles proposed by the Special Rapporteur to 
the International Law Commission.76 Proportionality recognises that there is a balance to be struck 
between the value of a military objective and the incidental damage caused in launching an attack 
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upon that objective.77 In striking the balance between proportionate use of force and proportionate 
collateral damage, the International Court of Justice has stated that ‘[r]espect for the environment 
is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles 
of necessity and proportionality.’78 The ICRC have found evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
which prohibits disproportionate environmental damage when attacks are launched against 
military objectives during non-international armed conflict.79 As such, there is strong evidence to 
support the assertion that belligerents are legally required to take damage to environmental civilian 
objects into account when planning proportionate attacks in non-international armed conflict.80 
The International Law Commission is presently considering a draft principle which suggests that 
proportionality should be applied to achieve the strongest possible protection,81 but there are many 
interpretive issues which prevent this goal from being realised in any given conflict. Indeed, the 
argument that ‘little law exists to explain how this should operate in practice’82 remains valid. The 
International Law Commission could develop ambitious interpretations of the principle which 
both affirm its application to environmental collateral damage and address the issues that presently 
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78 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Reports 226, 
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79 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 43(C) <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
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Specific Rules’, (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 7, at p. 10  
inhibit the full extent of the environmental protection that can be achieved through better 
proportionality assessments.83 
The principle of proportionality requires inadvertent harm to civilians and civilian objects to be 
balanced against the advantage anticipated by attacking a military objective.84 For example, if a 
military objective is located in an environment which is presumed to be a prima facie civilian object, 
then although the environment cannot be directly targeted, a certain degree of collateral damage 
is permitted when the military objective is attacked - the principle of proportionality regulates the 
extent of the damage that can be considered lawful in those circumstances. 
To respect the principle of proportionality, belligerents are required to weigh the military advantage 
that they anticipate to gain from an attack against the expected damage that will be caused as a 
result. The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY observed that ‘military objectives should not be 
targeted if the attack is likely to cause collateral environmental damage which would be excessive 
in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack would be expected to produce.’85 
Illustrating this rule, the United Nations Environment Programme assert that the destruction of 
‘an entire village or burning an entire forest to reach a single minor target’86 would not be 
proportionate collateral damage when weighed against the military advantaged gained by the attack. 
The evaluation of permissible levels of collateral damaged is based on both the direct military 
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advantage87 expected from the attack and the value of the environmental civilian object. The 
greater the value of the military objective, the greater the extent of the proportionate collateral 
damage that can be caused; the higher the value of the environmental civilian object, the lesser the 
collateral damage that may be permitted.88  
3.1 Valuing the Environment Correctly in Proportionality Assessments 
There is an inherent vagueness within the principle of proportionality that makes calculating 
proportionate environment damage ‘easier to proclaim than to implement in practice.’89 It is not 
immediately clear from the principle how exactly military targets or environmental civilian objects 
ought to be valued when assessing the anticipated proportionality of an attack90 Moreover, value 
judgements may change over time.91 The optimum way to conduct a balancing exercise under the 
                                                          
87 Military advantage essentially means that the act must have positive military utility or purpose. In terms of what 
counts as being concrete and direct military advantage, the ICRC Customary IHL Database provides useful 
explanations. The ICRC Customary Law Study helpfully highlights that ‘Upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, 
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the advantage anticipated by the attacker from the destruction, capture or neutralization of the object.’ Bothe, Partsch 
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88 Hulme, fn. 84, 126 
89 Desgagné, fn. 80, 116 
90 Robert Perry Barnidge Jr, ‘The Principle of Proportionality Under International Humanitarian Law and Operation 
Cast Lead’ in William C. Banks (ed), New Battlefields/Old Laws (Columbia University Press 2011), 276 
91 Though it may be argued that contemporary assessments of the public conscience, as represented by the exponential 
growth in international environmental law, demonstrate a strong trend in favour of valuing environmental integrity 
quite highly. For early scholarly discussions on this point see Michael Bothe ‘The Protection of the Environment in 
Times of Armed Conflict: Legal Rules, Uncertainty, Deficiencies and Public Developments’, (1991) 34 German 
Yearbook of International Law 54, at p. 56. See also Richards and Schmitt, supra n. 13, at pp. 1084-1085 arguing that 
environmental damage barely registered as a point of conflict analysis in the 1950s, but that it is the focus of substantial 
principle of proportionality is to compare like values with like.92 However this is not always 
possible when military objectives and environmental civilian objects are being compared93 since 
‘military, humanitarian and environmental values’94 are different from each other and not directly 
comparable.95 For example, would attacking enemy headquarters to end a conflict justify the 
destruction of an endangered species whose extinction is all but guaranteed through the collateral 
damage expected as a result of the attack? What if the environmental value was more abstract – 
for example, the benefit of upholding ecosystem integrity – how could that be weighed accurately 
against the same military objective? There is certainly substantial dissonance between military and 
environmental values96 that has not yet been fully reconciled in theory or practice to date. 
Valuing the environment correctly and objectively is a difficult task, even without the concurrent 
requirement to value a military objective, and it is likely an element of the proportionality 
calculation that state armed forces and non-state armed groups alike are ill-equipped to carry out 
competently during non-international armed conflict. While in best case scenarios environmental 
impact assessments may be conducted during the planning phases of an attack97, anticipating the 
environmental consequences and then valuing those consequences appropriately against military 
values are very different exercises. Guidance in this regard from the International Law Commission 
to establish some common ground upon which environment-military valuations can be compared 
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96 Ibid. 
97 Droege and Tougas, supra n. 11, at  p. 30 
and balanced would therefore significantly enhance environmental protection through the 
principle of proportionality. The breadth of the International Law Commission’s work on the issue 
of environmental protection in armed conflict,98 drawing upon pre- and post-conflict laws as well 
as the jus in bello, means that methods of valuing the environment that have been developed in 
other fields of practice could be identified and adapted to develop guiding principles. At the very 
least, the International Law Commission could recognise the issue and encourage further work to 
be done on the valuation of environmental objects during non-international armed conflict.99  
As it stands, there is no method that can be applied to accurately value the environment in 
proportionality assessments. In reviewing NATO’s bombing campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the ICTY were unable to place a value on the environment that was 
damaged, asserting instead that at ‘a minimum, actions resulting in massive environmental 
destruction, especially where they do not serve a clear and important military purpose, would be 
questionable.’100 The ICTY stated that serious environmental damage could only be justified where 
a ‘very substantial military advantage’101 was achieved. However, devoid of value, it would be 
impossible to determine whether environmental damage is significant or not. For example, would 
massive environmental destruction amount to the destruction of an entire rainforest ecosystem? What if 
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the last female white rhino became collateral damage in an attack that significantly destabilised 
enemy forces, shortening the conflict? Would this environmental damage be proportionate to the 
military advantage gained? The answers depend on how the environment is valued in any given 
circumstance and principles based on existing international environmental law, or even the dictates 
of the public conscience, could be developed by the International Law Commission to assist 
belligerents in making accurate proportionality assessments prior to attack.  
3.2 Introducing Objectivity into Proportionality Assessments of Environmental Collateral 
Damage 
The extent of the collateral damage that can be lawfully caused to the environment currently 
depends on how it is valued subjectively by belligerents.102 Military commanders would not, in 
general, be considered to be environmental experts with the ability to calculate the true value of 
an environmental object, and as such, the environment is at risk of being under-valued when 
proportionality calculations are made. If a subjective point of view is presently determinative when 
calculating proportionality, then there is currently no incentive for commanders to improve their 
capacity to value environmental targets. Valuing the environment correctly when calculating 
proportionality may reduce the options available to the commander when planning attacks. 
Subjective ignorance of the true value of the environment could actually be militarily advantageous 
under the principle of proportionality as it is currently interpreted. This under-valuation results in 
greater collateral damage being allowed than would otherwise be lawful under a more objective or 
informed calculation.  
Moreover, there are certainly unresolved issues regarding the foreseeability of environmental 
damage in pre-attack proportionality assessments. If environmental damage is unforeseeable then 
of course it cannot be factored into any test for proportionality that is applied in a given situation. 
                                                          
102 Schmitt, supra n. 92, 207. See also Richards and Schmitt, supra n. 13, citing Gardam at footnote 166. 
However, foreseeability increases with knowledge, and knowledge about the environment, the 
effect of harm on certain parts of the environment, the inter-connectedness between ecosystems 
is improving at a significant rate.103 It may be argued that the subjective latitude afforded to 
commanders on the battlefield is naturally diminishing with increasing global knowledge about the 
environment and the detrimental effects of certain types of harm. Therefore, in developing 
guidelines to enhance the protection of the environment in non-international armed conflict, the 
International Law Commission could usefully consider introducing an objective test for the 
calculation of proportionality where environmental collateral damage is expected,104 based not on 
the subjective knowledge of the specific commander, but the subjective that a reasonably informed 
and environmentally-aware commander ought to possess. 
While the United Nations Environment Programme claim that ‘[m]any instances of environmental 
damage could be seen as a “disproportionate” response to a perceived threat and therefore 
considered illegal’,105 this perspective fails to recognise the wholly subjective test that may be 
applied to evaluate proportionality after an attack has occurred. If the evaluation is based on the 
subjective knowledge of a specific commander, and if they did not place a high value on the 
environment in the first place, it is likely that most environmental damage in non-international 
armed conflict would not be considered disproportionate. Developing principles that insist on a 
relevant objective test, a test which requires commanders to inform themselves of the types of 
environmental damage that can occur following certain types of military actions, could incentivise 
commanders to make proportionality assessments that value the environment appropriately, and 
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could greatly increase the degree of protection that can be expected through the principle of 
proportionality going forward.  
3.3 Conclusion to the Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality does indeed have the capacity to prevent disproportionate 
environmental damage in non-international armed conflict from occurring. However, belligerents 
may find it difficult to value environmental objects appropriately, and then compare that valuation 
against the advantage to be gained from attacking a specific military objective. Moreover, the 
degree to which environmental damage is considered to be disproportionate currently depends on 
the subjective value that is placed on the environment by the specific military commander at the 
time of an attack. This subjectivity is the Achilles heel of the principle of proportionality as many 
military commanders may not be equipped with the knowledge to enable them to value the 
environment appropriately, nor are they incentivised to improve their capacity to do so. Insisting 
that an objective test is used when environmental collateral damage is being evaluated so that 
environmental values are properly balanced against anticipated military advantage would 
significantly improve the power of the principle of proportionality to protect the environment in 
non-international armed conflict. 
4. The Doctrine of Military Necessity 
The doctrine of military necessity is one of the oldest customary principles in the laws of armed 
conflict106 and it manifests itself on the battlefield in two ways. Both have implications for the 
protection of the environment in non-international armed conflict. Firstly, the doctrine requires 
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all acts on the battlefield to be militarily necessary. This means that any damage that is caused to 
the environment during armed conflict should not be wanton or excessive because to do so would 
not serve any military purpose.107 Secondly, the doctrine permits, in very limited circumstances, 
the temporary suspension of specific prohibitions within the laws of armed conflict where a 
military necessity exists.108 Although this would appear to permit environmental damage in 
situations where a military necessity prevails, in practice, the laws of armed conflict do not support 
this manifestation of the doctrine in non-international armed conflict. However, there appeared 
to be some uncertainty about the way in which the doctrine of military necessity operated during 
discussions at the International Law Commission109 and so clarification is certainly warranted. 
Overall, the doctrine of military necessity, if applied strictly and objectively, can play an important 
role in protecting the environment during non-international armed conflict. However, critically, 
the International Law Commission have not engaged in sufficient substantive consideration of 
military necessity to date.110 The following critical analysis may be useful in developing more 
ambitious and appropriate principles before their current programme of work is concluded. 
4.1 Requirement for Acts to be Militarily Necessary 
In the first instance, the doctrine of military necessity requires all actions taken during armed 
conflict to be militarily necessary because damage ‘caused carelessly [is] not “necessary” to the 
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achievement of any military purpose.’111 O’ Brien argues that the purpose of military necessity 
means that there exists ‘no equally effective lawful military means, involving less damage or 
suffering’112 to achieve the same ends. The necessity does not need to be urgent or imperative,113 
but it must be supported by circumstances which preclude the pursuit of reasonable alternatives 
at the time the action is taken.114 Therefore any environmental damage that occurs during non-
international armed conflict must not be wanton or careless, but a consequence of the only 
reasonable actions that could have been pursued at the time the damage occurred. Damage or 
destruction to the environment in non-international armed conflict must be connected to the 
pursuit of defeating enemy forces - it cannot be superfluous.115 In this way, the contemporary 
purpose of military necessity has departed significantly from its origins as a rule to trump 
humanitarian laws which might otherwise prohibit certain conduct.116 This is an important point, 
with provenance in jurisprudence from the IMT at Nuremberg117, and certainly worth emphasising 
in any principles that are developed by the International Law Commission as interpretations to the 
contrary have begun to emerge in state military manuals.118  
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Military necessity was used to justify environmental damage caused during the Second World War 
in the The Hostages Trial119 at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In this case, General 
Lothar Rendulic argued that the scorched earth policy implemented during the German retreat 
from Finnmark was required by military necessities that existed at the time. The Tribunal held that 
although the necessity in retrospect did not exist, and viewed with hindsight the damage caused 
was indeed superfluous, there was sufficient subjective necessity at the time of the actions, even 
though General Rendulic was mistaken in believing that his forces were in jeopardy of imminent 
attack, to justify the environmental damage.120  
The subjective perspective of the commander at the time the destruction occurs continues to be 
determinative of whether environmental damage is justified by military necessity or superfluous, 
as the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY endorsed it as a legitimate precedent for any similar 
future case.121 Yet the subjective test significantly decreases the positive effect that military 
necessity can have in prohibiting unnecessary environmental damage during non-international 
armed conflict since mistaken beliefs, if reasonably and honestly held, would be enough to satisfy 
the requirements of the doctrine in relation to most environmental damage resulting from a course 
of action during armed conflict. To improve environmental protection under this application of 
the doctrine of military necessity, future principles that are developed should challenge this 
perspective and insist that an objective test be used to ensure that environmental damage in non-
international armed conflict is clearly militarily necessary and not superfluous or wanton. 
4.2 Suspension of the Laws of Armed Conflict due to Military Necessity 
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During the American Civil War, it was felt that military necessity had the potential to become a 
‘rule-swallowing’ norm and so the doctrine was, at the time, very narrowly construed.122 However 
fears about the doctrine subverting the laws of armed conflict were borne out in mid-19th century 
Germany when the doctrine became the ‘bete noir’123 of international law under the maxim 
Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier – the necessities of war take precedence over the rules of war.124 
This interpretation of military necessity permitted ‘the commander on the battlefield [to] decide in 
every case whether the rules will be respected or ignored, depending on the demands of the 
military situation at the time.’125 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, condemned the 
kriegsraison theory of military necessity during The Hostages Trial126 when they indicated quite clearly 
that ‘military necessity or expediency [does] not justify a violation of positive rules.’127 Military 
necessity now remains subordinate to the laws of armed conflict at all times.128 Fears that military 
necessity permits ‘uncontrolled brute force to rage rampant over the battlefield or wherever the 
military have control’129 are no longer supported by contemporary interpretations of the laws of 
armed conflict.  Despite the perception that military necessity sometimes appears to justify ‘acts 
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of dubious legality, normality, and utility’130, the doctrine remains fundamentally subject to the laws 
of armed conflict, rather than as a blanket exception to them.131 Arguments in favour of this 
interpretation refer to the fact that contemporary laws of armed conflict were drafted with the 
exigencies of military necessity in mind, and provision was explicitly provided for military necessity 
in relation to some limited treaty-based laws of armed conflict, and not provided in relation to the 
vast majority of others.132 
For example, Art. 54(5) of Additional Protocol I permits derogation from the prohibition against 
targeting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population in international armed 
conflict ‘where required by imperative military necessity’.133 However the comparable provision in 
Additional Protocol II, which applies to non-international armed conflict, contains no such 
permission to derogate. Therefore, even where a compelling military necessity exists, the 
protection granted by Article 14 of Additional Protocol II is absolute. The prohibition against 
pillage in Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II provides another good example of this point. 
This provision is frequently raised as a means of prohibiting wanton damage to and looting of 
natural resources during the conduct of hostilities.134 Article 4(2)(g) contains no clause which 
carves out an exception for situations of military necessity and as such, military necessity could not 
be used to justify pillage of natural resources in non-international armed conflict. Indeed, no treaty-
based provisions that are relevant to environmental protection in non-international armed conflict 
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contain clauses which permit derogations required by military necessity.135 It is quite clear that 
military necessary could not be used to justify environmental damage in non-international armed 
conflict if such damage otherwise breached existing treaty-based or customary laws armed conflict. 
However, worryingly, the ICRC have concluded, on the basis of state practice and opinio juris drawn 
from a very small number of states136 that customary international law permits the destruction of 
the environment in non-international armed conflict if justified by military necessity.137 The ICRC 
have suggested that ‘destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless 
required by imperative military necessity.’138 Although this is fundamentally at odds with a correct 
application of the law, left unaddressed it may in time reverse the subordinate position of military 
necessity and reinstate a kriegraison-style norm as the dominant rule. The law is clear at present: 
military necessity cannot be used to justify a violation of the laws of armed conflict unless it is 
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‘explicitly provided for by the rule in question’.139 The International Law Commission should 
unequivocally affirm the subordinate status of the doctrine of military necessity in any principles 
that are developed to ensure that any environmental protection that indirectly results from the 
treaty-based or customary laws of non-international armed conflict is not undermined. 
4.3 Conclusion to Military Necessity 
It is clear that military necessity may only be used to justify a breach of the laws of armed conflict 
if such an exception is explicitly included in the text of a particular treaty-provision or is inherently 
part of a customary rule. As Hulme surmises, ‘the doctrine of military necessity has become a 
limited one, active only where sanctioned within the law itself.’140 In this regard, military necessity 
does not undermine existing treaty or customary law that provides indirect protection to the 
environment in non-international armed conflict as the treaty-based rules in Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II have no associated military necessity clause, and the principles of 
distinction and proportionality cannot be suspended if an overriding military necessity exists. 
However, the subjective test for military necessity that is used to assess general environmental 
damage that occurs on the battlefield weakens the overall level of protection that this customary 
principle can deliver and there is an imperative need to introduce some degree of objectivity into 
applications of the doctrine of military necessity going forward. 
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5. Conclusion 
The main objective of this article was to fill key knowledge gaps regarding the protection of the 
environment in non-international armed conflict through customary international law and in so 
doing, highlight crucial issues that the international community has an unprecedented opportunity 
to address as part of the International Law Commission’s ongoing work. The approach to 
enhancing environmental protection in non-international armed conflict presented in this article – 
avoiding insurmountable issues regarding the development of new law by progressively and 
purposively interpreting existing law – has significant potential. It is hoped that the proposals that 
have been suggested in the analysis above can provide grounds for discussions at the International 
Law Commission to develop more detailed principles and guidelines which meaningfully improve 
environmental protection in non-international armed conflict going forward. 
In this article, it was demonstrated that the established customary international law principles of 
distinction, proportionality, and military necessity can each play a better role in enhancing 
protection of the environment during non-international armed conflict. Progressive 
interpretations of each customary law, if developed and incorporated into principles by the 
International Law Commission, would constitute a significant advancement in the legal protection 
of the environment during non-international armed conflict.  
Regarding the principle of distinction, it was argued that a mere restatement of the principle is 
unlikely to improve environmental protection in future non-international armed conflicts. Instead, 
clarification that the environment as a whole might be considered a civilian object which cannot 
be directly attacked, and narrowly construing the circumstances in which the environment can be 
classified as a military objective, would serve to better improve environmental protection under 
this principle. While dual-use objects present particularly difficult issues, asserting that some 
specific environmental objects – those that are of special significance or which contribute to the 
solution of global challenges – can never be classified as military objectives would enhance 
environmental protection in non-international armed conflict where it is arguably needed most.  
While the principle of proportionality appears to require a straightforward balance between the 
value of attacking a military objective and the expected resulting collateral damage to civilians and 
civilian objects, it was argued that valuing environmental civilian objects correctly is not always 
achieved when this principle is applied in practice. This is due to the inherent subjectivity within 
the principle, which regards a commander’s subjective valuation of civilian environmental objects 
as definitive. As a result, environmental civilian objects are frequently under-valued, and therefore 
at risk of greater collateral damage when attacks are being planned and implemented. This article 
proposes that the subjective valuation of environmental civilian objects be replaced by an 
understanding which requires objective valuations of the environment to be factored into 
proportionality assessments. This would allow a more appropriate value to be assigned to 
environmental civilian objects, thereby decreasing the risk of undervaluation and the objectively 
disproportionate harm that can follow. Such an understanding would ensure that any collateral 
damage that is caused to the environment is minimised as far as possible under the circumstances, 
which the entire purpose of the principle of proportionality.  
It was asserted that the doctrine of military necessity can play a significant role in protecting the 
environment in non-international armed conflict. It requires all actions taken during armed conflict 
and all damage to be militarily necessary, and so if damage to the environment is not militarily 
necessary under the circumstances, then it is not permitted. However, at present, a subjective test 
is used to assess necessity on the battlefield, and it was argued that this ought to be replaced by an 
objective test when it comes to determining that environmental damage is militarily necessary. 
Moreover, while the doctrine of military necessity may permit derogations from specific laws of 
armed conflict, none of the laws of armed conflict that apply during non-international armed 
conflict to indirectly protect the environment contain such an exception. Acknowledging this in 
any development of the law that follows the International Law Commission’s examination of the 
issue would provide much-needed clarity and improved environmental protection on the 
battlefield. 
While the customary international laws of distinction, proportionality and necessity can be 
harnessed to deliver better environmental protection in non-international armed conflict, that 
enhanced protection will only take place if the parameters and the potential of these customary 
rules are fully and strategically embraced by states and the wider international community. The 
International Law Commission’s programme of work on environmental protection in armed 
conflict is an ideal place to begin such ground-breaking changes in the way the law is interpreted 
and applied, and for novel interpretations of existing law to be shaped. While the draft principles 
that are presently under consideration by the International Law Commission do little more than 
refer to existing law, and as such do little to enhance environmental protection, this article 
demonstrates that there is significant potential for more ambitious proposals to be made to 
enhance environmental protection in non-international armed conflict going forward. 
 
 
 
 
